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Abstract
ORDINARY MEANING IS A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK at the “ordinary meaning doctrine” used by
courts to interpret language. The ordinary meaning doctrine is the “judicial commitment to interpreting
language in legal texts according to its ‘ordinary meaning.’”2 This interpretation is based on an objective
standard: the meaning of a word can exist independently of differing opinions of that meaning.3 This book
argues that the current system used by judges in the United States fails to attain the goal of deciphering the
ordinary meaning of words.4 Slocum argues that the ordinary meaning doctrine has not been examined in
great depth,5 and offers a framework for how legal interpretation of ordinary meaning should be established.6
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Ordinary Meaning, A Theory Of The 
Most Fundamental Principle Of Legal 
Interpretation, by Brian G. Slocum1
MADELINE BOYCE
ORDINARY MEANING IS A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK at the “ordinary meaning 
doctrine” used by courts to interpret language. The ordinary meaning doctrine 
is the “judicial commitment to interpreting language in legal texts according to 
its ‘ordinary meaning.’”2 This interpretation is based on an objective standard: 
the meaning of a word can exist independently of differing opinions of that 
meaning.3 This book argues that the current system used by judges in the United 
States fails to attain the goal of deciphering the ordinary meaning of words.4 
Slocum argues that the ordinary meaning doctrine has not been examined in 
great depth,5 and offers a framework for how legal interpretation of ordinary 
meaning should be established.6
In chapter one, Slocum introduces the ordinary meaning doctrine, giving 
examples of interpretations of this doctrine from various U.S. Supreme Court 
justices throughout history. He discusses the widespread reference to the ordinary 
meaning doctrine in legal decisions,7 as well as some of the reasoning for this 
1. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
2. Ibid at 2.
3. Ibid at 4.
4. Ibid at 27.
5. Ibid at 28.
6. Ibid at 27.
7. Ibid at 5.
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influence.8 In this chapter, counter arguments to the use of the ordinary meaning 
doctrine are introduced which are discussed in more detail in later chapters.
Chapter two situates the discussion of the proper approach to interpreting 
ordinary meaning within the broader context of principles of legal interpretation 
and the communicative meaning of words.9 It discusses several determinants of 
communicative meaning.
Chapter three discuss the inherent tension between creating an objective 
standard of ordinary meaning (given that it must be somewhat constant between 
contexts) and the fact that the meaning of words is contextual in nature.10 This 
chapter also assesses the justifications for the ordinary meaning doctrine in order 
to show that legal interpretation of the meaning of words should include both 
an exploration of communicative as well as ordinary meaning.11 This chapter 
goes on to outline François Recanati’s hierarchy which breaks meaning into three 
levels: “sentence meaning,” “what is said,” and “what is communicated.”12
In chapter four, Slocum discusses quantifiers13 as an example of an area 
where contextual information needs to be assessed in order to determine 
ordinary meaning, and criticizes courts’ failure to take quantifying information 
into account when interpreting ordinary meaning.14 By discussing the theory 
behind quantifiers, Slocum’s objective is to show that semantic theories can be of 
assistance in creating structure for determining ordinary meaning. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the place of substantive and textual canons within 
ordinary meaning interpretations.15
Chapter five addresses the use of dictionary definitions in the interpretation 
of ordinary meaning. Slocum argues that dictionary definitions are too broad and 
can convey “possible” rather than ordinary meaning.16 He stresses the importance 
8. Ibid at 8.
9. The communicative meaning of a word being defined here as “the linguistic meaning 
communicated by the text considering all the sources of meaning relevant to the message the 
author was trying to convey” Ibid at 5.
10. Ibid at 93-95.
11. Ibid at 95-98.
12. Ibid at 125.
13. “[A]n expression that modifies a referring expression in terms of amount.” Ibid at 32.
14. Ibid at 153.
15. “Substantive canons are normatively based presumptions about statutory meaning that 
are derived from the common law, other statutes, or the Constitution. Textual canons are 
presumptions that are drawn from the drafter’s choice of words, their grammatical placement 
in sentences, and their relationship to other parts of the “whole” statute.” Ibid at 33.
16. Ibid at 215.
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of assessing word use on the sentence level, rather than acontextually.17 He then 
uses case law to illustrate the difference between classical and contextual analyses 
in judgments utilizing the ordinary meaning doctrine.18
Chapter six is the concluding chapter. Slocum summarizes the arguments 
made throughout the book, and offers suggestions for further research.19 He also 
discusses broad patterns of the use of the ordinary meaning doctrine, how it has 
changed over time, and continues to change.20
17. Ibid at 216.
18. Ibid at 217.
19. Ibid at 281.
20. Ibid at 283.
